Conscription Campaigns in Australia: WW1

Conscription Campaigns in Australia: WW1 Can the Australia governments conscription during World War I be considered a public relations campaign? Why or why not? What specific â€Å"strategies† were used to encourage the Australian community to support (or not) conscription? Refer to relevant public relations theories in your response. In your response you will need to consider the notion of a public relations campaign. Compare your understanding of a public relations campaign to similar events. Compare this in terms of the historical development of public relations at that time. Public relation and the is the art of winning people’s hearts so it is very important for us to fully understanding it by using the relevant examples from the past because it is much easier for us to analyze these samples’ challenges , achievements and methods in order to apply into the current situation. By this action we can minimize not only the costs which can be incurred but also the risks of failure which we might dealing with. So let’s moving on to the question about the Australian Government’s conscription during the World War I. Personally, I think it is a public relation campaign because the definition of an campaign is an â€Å" organized activity or operation designed to attain a political, social or commercial goal†(Bobbit and Sullivan, 2005, p.32). Hence, a public relations campaign, according to Kendall, are considered as a â€Å"â€Å"concerted effort of an organization to build socially responsible relationships by achieving research-based goals through the application of communication strategies and the measurement of outcomes†. Let’s take a closer look at some keywords such as : â€Å"organized activity†, â€Å"political goal†, â€Å"build socially responsible relationship†, â€Å"application of communication strategies â€Å" and â€Å"the measurement of outcomes† and think about conscription of Australian Government’s in World War I or more specifically under the lead of Billy Hughes- The Prime Minister. First of all, we can see here this conscription is and â€Å"organized activity† which require a lot of preparation for Yes vote and in more particularly, Mark Sheehan( 2007) states that:† the campaign to persuade voters went beyond the methods used in recruiting†. In addition, this campaign served a â€Å"political goal â€Å"which is the need to win the war or in other word to extend conscription so that men could be sent to reinforce the front line in Europe to serve for the World War I. Thirdly, this campaign is trying to â€Å"build socially responsible relationship† by called ‘shirkers’ and ‘traitors’ to many eligible men over the age of 21 by using posters and speeches in order to persuade targeted men ‘eligible’ to enlist. Finally, it is the â€Å"application of communication strategies† because of using â€Å"theatr es, cinema, town halls, sporting events and even beaches† in the campaign in 1917 and this is noted by Carlyon (p.525) and it also failed in two referendums-which is a â€Å"measurement of outcome†. These are the proofs that the conscription occurred in World War I is a public relations campaign. But the question here is why it is failed in considered about the strategies of Yes- voters, the length of campaign, the target public and so on†¦ To answer this question we need to go through a bit about history Let’s first start with the definition of conscription which â€Å"is compulsory enlistment in the armed forces†. This means that it is compulsory with every men in the age bracket. In 1916, Australia had that conscription but it maintain inside Australian territory and that’s why Billy Hughes’ public relation campaign start in order to extend conscription so that men could be sent to reinforce the front line in Europe. And this is where the battle of voting started for overseas military service that split the community. Secondly, I want to talk briefly about the anti- conscription with we might call the No campaign of the labor movement and the member was in the Labor Party due to the threat to the white Australian working man. And Hughes’ pro-war enthusiasm made him into deep conflict with the Queensland Australian Labor Party Premier, T. J. Ryan. Therefore, Ryan did everything in his abilities to defeat conscription. Thirdly, let’s moving on the for- conscription which we called the Yes vote, in this part we will discuss the strategies and also some of important points of this campaign. About the member, this campaign was strongly supported by the business community who were the benefiter substantially from the introduction of conscription as suppliers of arms, uniforms and equipment, and by those who saw loyalty to God and Empire as paramount. By using not only propaganda and dissemination of information but also the sophisticated two-way asymmetric activity of opinion leaders- Billy Hughes was successful in create public opinion in the conscription in World War I. Cameron et al (2007, p.175) stated that opinion leaders frequently act as catalysts in the formation of public opinion by using mass media to make opinion flows from these leaders to the public. The theory in this campaign is media- dependency theory which is people who know little about the subject need to depend on mass media for their source of information and opinions. In addition, there are two ways of thinking ( yes and no for conscription) which is framing theory because of journalists and public relation personnel support a specific feature of a issue. The strategies of this campaign can be summaries as followed: Creating Government supported grass-root groups in each state (Robson 1970, p.99) in order to make it easier for opinion leaders to persuade the voters of the value of offering up their sons or husbands in what they thought â€Å"the most noble of fights†. Prime Minister Billy Hughes indicated in 1916 â€Å"cabled all mayors and shire presidents throughout the Commonwealth asking to take immediate steps to develop vigorous local organizations† (Robson 1970, p.106). And Hughes a strong network with the Premier of New South Wales, a former Prime Minister, and the Anglican Primate of Australia and the Catholic Archbishop of Sydney (Carlyon 2006, p.268). In addition, Dame Nellie Melba sang at events organized to support for the Yes vote and influence women (Robson 1970, p.107). The â€Å"mainstream press, city and country† (Carlyon 2006, p258) also supported under Hughes’s call for Yes –vote in conscription campaign. Understood that soldiers at the front were a vital vote for this campaign, Hughes developed a Soldier’s Manifesto and sought wide distribution a month before the referendum. For this task he relied on war correspondent Keith Murdoch. Through his network in the military Murdoch arranged delivery of the Manifesto for each soldier and also distribution to the British press. Moreover, he also organized meetings of soldiers which would carry resolutions asking the voters at home to vote yes. Despite the Prime Minister’s efforts the vote of the serving soldiers was uncertain. In a second attempt in 1917 , Hughes broadened the use of persuasive tactics and pointed out Claude McKay, a former journalist and writer, to work on the promotion of the campaign by taking place on the back of other events and to that extent caught the public unaware and unprepared to debate or question the organizers. And in this time, every mass media are used but it still lead to a failure for Hughes and Yes –voters which is quite narrowly 49 percent over 51 percent. So in summary, from 1916 to 1917, Hughes created 2 referendums which is voting for extend conscription from within Australia territory to Western Front Line for the call of England in World War 1 but both two times he failed closely although he tried really hard in term of public relations campaign by the using of two way information and mass media. Imagine that the Australian government wants to re-introduce conscription in 2013. You can choose to take the pro-conscription view (and support the government) or the anti-conscription view. How would you implement a campaign given your understanding of public relations theory, its role, and society today? You will need to break down the campaign into elements (such as goal, target public, strategies and evaluation). Demonstrate how these elements would be realized in 2013. Strategies need to be realistic, achievable and theoretically sound, determined through appropriate research. You can use the same strategies as the historical campaign, if you think it is relevant. Or you can come up with your own ideas. Dont worry about budget, imagine money is no object. If I’m leader of the pro-conscription view I will think about the moves of Billy Hughes in the old times and analysis these moves then based on these background I will update it because remembering that two referendums were closed with very narrow results 49 percent over 51 percent in the first time and the second time with a slightly bigger gap. So in my opinion, these results reflect a good trend but not right methods which need to improve by using some of the public relations theories and persuasion plus mass media effect in modern life. That’s why some of the commentators while trying to explain the failure of Billy Hughes stated that it might be the issues of providing a focus for a lot of different points of view about the war. In particular, there were some people opposed the war while others were opposed to conscription as a principle. And because at that time, the economy was in bad shape therefore others were saying that they were hurt by the economic situatio n hence the World War I, and so on.Consequently, public opinions are diverting in too many ways which are hard to unite because people were not, but they all agreed on the conscription question, and the issue gave them all a chance to express their opposition. In 1917 in an attempt, Hughes held another vote on the conscription and in this time he actually had a majority in both Houses of Parliament, and did not need the vote but because of his desire, he want to give the people another chance to overcome what he called as their great mistake in rejecting conscription the previous year a chance to correct themselves. But in controversy, the campaign was again fall in the wrong way of his thought, and conscription was again defeated, this time by a slightly larger margin. So in this time we need to work out again about the theory of publicity’s opinions and the method in order to improve the result. So let’s start with goal and target public and I think it probably the same with the old time which will be more than 51 percent voting in the referendum by using these target public such as followed. Firstly, the business man who support for the conscription and benefit because of the war, they can be weapon companies and related industries or people who faithful with British Government, Australian Government or Catholic Church. The reason why we need to target these groups because this group is what we called the ground which we can build a pyramid on that, these groups will contribute the money and the enthusiasm to do anything to support for the conscription. The second part of public which we need to target is the Australian women who might be the mothers, wives, girlfriends, sisters, and daughters of the listed soldiers which can support or anti our votes. About the importance of women in this context , we need to remind a bit about history with the withdrawal of about h alf a million men in 1916, and more clearly man is in crisis of going to work because of their direct replacement by women which will be happen if we have a conscription currently. Finally, there is one target who Billy Hughes were targeted but were not succeed and this is soldiers or most importantly the up front-soldiers who are fighting. Because these man can be described as â€Å"role model† which are called â€Å"informal opinion leaders†. According to Wilcox, â€Å"informal opinion leaders† are those â€Å"who have clout with peers because of some special characteristic. They may be role models who are admired and emulated or opinion leaders who can exert peer pressure on others to go along with something. In general, informal opinion leaders exert considerable influence on their peer groups by being highly informed, articulate, and credible on particular issues. â€Å"Consequently, in this case, if we want to recruit more soldiers who are enlisted, we n eed to create a â€Å"role model† which everyone must know, want to know, inspired by his/her. If we can do that the morale of the soldiers who are already enlisted or thought about enlisting will be very high which will befit for our public relations campaign not like Billy Hughes’s campaign. In the methods section, I think we need to base on the old times method because basically they are not on the wrong tracks but sharpen it by using mass media and remember technology in the modern life. In addition , keeping in mind that when we using mass media effects , we need to care about some theories of it which are agenda- setting theory, framing theory and lastly but also most importantly conflict theory. Let’s start which the definition of mass media effects: â€Å"traditional media, implies that information from a public relations source can be efficiently and rapidly disseminated to literally millions of people.†(Wilcox, 2013).Hence, a detailed recent research carried by professors and students at University of Technology in Sydney (UTS) showed that 55 percentage of the stories in leading Australian dailies come from what we called public relation sources. Therefore, the importance of mass media with public relation is undeniable with the appearance of public relations people who uses mass media to become major players in forming public opinion because of their â€Å"hot news† which are coming in the first compare to others. Understanding the importance of mass media is easy but how to use mass media require an understanding of theories which started by agenda- setting theory that is defined by Klapper as limited-effects model of mass media, media content sets the agenda for public discussion, and he stated that† mass medial ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause for audience effects, but rather functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influence.† Therefore, in the theme of this theory, we need to have a public relations campaign which not only setting the time for people to come back and follow but also can convey the set of attributes about conscription by using mass media day by day which leading to impact what audiences think about, according to Patricia Curtin, Qi Qiu an d Spiro Khiousis. Thirdly, framing theory is a theory which related to journalist and how they â€Å"frame† the story by choosing the particular facts, themes, solutions or others features†¦ And by that, journalists can create a different point of views for targeted public. That’s why political science Professors Shanto Iyengar an Donal Kinder note how â€Å"public relations professional working for political campaigns seek to emphasize consideration that will help voters decide in their favor, often enlisted the expertise of a popular leader, and to downplay the considerations that will hurt their cause or candidate.† In this case, we can use journalists to protect our side by framing conscription as good deed while the cause effects at unavoidable or fair price which we need to pay. Finally, the conflict is about disagreement between two or more individuals, groups, organizations, or communities because of the gap in interests. As the result, conflict theory is â€Å"research about differences among individuals or groups and explains conflicting interests, goals, values, or desires. Public opinion often reflects such different, or even conflicting, views, attitudes, and behaviors.† At this point , we can see how importance the conflict theory is, keep in mind that it what Billy Hughes missed, the united of public opinions because of lacking of researches at those time which we can do it easily by using technology such as Facebook, debating on YouTube, television or mass media. By unify so many differences or in other word diversities of the public, we can create an enthusiasm â€Å"army† to support for our vote. About the evaluation, because of the development of technology, it is quite easy now for us to know whether we do the right thing by using poll. Poll can use likely everywhere on the internet (for example Facebook, YouTube, or other social networks like twitters, if the websites don’t have we can use the like button to estimate it or number of views could be a good indicator) , in the subway, shopping mall or other common places by using the face to face methods .Remember that we can use the mass media to know how much attention we could draw. References: Dennis L. Wilcox

Malayan Campaign – the Matador Plan

MALAYAN CAMPAIGN – THE MATADOR PLAN INTRODUCTION â€Å"Unfortunately, it has come to this, that either Japan must stop her expansion, or England must willingly give up some of what she has or hopes to have. Therein lies a cause for war. † Lt Cdr Tota Ishimaru, Imperial Japanese Navy 1. The fall of Malaya and Singapore to the hand of the Japanese is a tremendous sign that showed the failure of Operation Matador. In this battle study, there are chronology of events that will guide us very closely in knowing and understanding the reason why this operation failed to meet its objectives.In doing the research on the background of the battle of Malaya and the relativity to the Operation Matador, our syndicate members came across a reference to a plan of action for the defence of Singapore codenamed â€Å"Matador†. In fact there were two plans, so totally different, that in the end they contributed to the downfall of Singapore. Both had their weaknesses and one of the ma jor ones was the lack of co-ordination and command between the Army, Navy and Air Force. The other and more serious was a clash of ideals.The drawn-up plan was Land based Matador and Sea Based Matador. 2. From the research done, Operation Matador is not the sole reason for the fall of Malaya or even Singapore, besides there is some other reasons that had been identified as a contributing factor as well. This has been discussed in detail under the column of Battle Analysis. An examine on the lesson learned from this battle study would benefit the most as it focuses more on principles of war that will teaches us how, why, when and where it is applicable for an action plan taken at one time.AIM 3. This paper will examine two main part of the whole study on Matador Plan. The first part is to analyze the incidents that occur prior and upon the operation called The Matador Plan. Secondly, it is fundamentals to determine the lessons learnt and the effects on both forces. OBJECTIVE 4. The m ain objective of this battle study is to meet the requirement of the EOBC serial 28/2006 and secondly is to learn and adapt the knowledge of the war history generally on the Malayan Campaign and specifically the Matador Plan.In this way the young officers would be able to use battle study as a comparison between previous and present state of battle warfare in order to meet any circumstances and decision makings in the near future. SCOPE 5. Scope of discussions are as follow: a. Background. 1)Pre-war examination. 2)Forces involved. 3)The Attack. b. Matador Plan. 1)Land Based Matador 2)Sea Based Matador c. Chronology of events. d. Analysis on factors and effects. e. Tactical aspects applied. g. Lesson Learnt. h.Conclusion. BATTLE BACKGROUND PRE-WAR EXAMINATION 6. Before we look further into the Matador Plan, the fundamental or the main causes that inflict the war in Malaya should be given a consideration as it may be very useful in understanding the battle study. The battle in Malaya was a conflict between British Commonwealth forces, comprised of British, Indian, Australian and Malayan units, and the Imperial Japanese Army from December 8, 1941 until January 31, 1942 during the Second World War.Prior the attack by th Japanese forces, the British government's plans relied primarily on the stationing of a strong fleet at the Singapore Naval Base in the event of any enemy hostility, both to defend Britain's Far Eastern possessions and the route to Australia. At this time tension mounted in the region folowing the outbreak of the European war and the French in Indo-China clashed with the Thais. The Japanese make use of this as an oppurtunity with the increase on aggression over the region as well. 7.Upon the completion of the Singapore Naval Base and airfields on Singapore Island with other constructions on the Malayan Peninsula was underway, it was decided by the Air Ministry in London that was a right time to provide a fighter force for the area, even though few could be spared from the defence of Britain and her offensive in the Middle East. However, a threat to British and American possessions in the area was not considered to be imminent, as revealed in a letter from Prime Minister Churchill to US President Roosevelt, dated 15 February 1941: I do not myself think that the Japanese would likely to send the large military expedition necessary to lay seige to Singapore. The Japanese would no doubt occupy whatever strategic points and oilfields in the Dutch East Indies and thereabouts that they covet, and thus get a far better position for a full-scale attack on Singapore later on. They would also raid Australian and New Zealand ports and coasts, causing deep anxiety in those Dominions, which had already sent all their best trained fighting men to the Far East†. 8.In October 1940, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was appointed Commander-in-Chief Far East, and the G. H. Q. Far East opened at Singapore on the 18th November, 194 0. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the operational control and direction of training of British land and air forces in Malaya, Burma and Hong Kong, and for the co-ordination of plans for the defence of these territories. It also includes the control and training of British air forces in Ceylon and of reconnaissance squadrons in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal.His headquarters was an operational one, not administrative, and had no control over any naval forces. So Brook-Popham the man in charge on the spot had little control over the immediate military situation. Also just as important, he had no authority over the Civilian population in case of an impending war. This came under the direct control of Shenton–Thomas the Governor of Singapore, and to all intents and purposes he had absolute control. The only recourse Brook-Popham had to any control of the forces was directly to the Chiefs of Staff in London. FORCES INVOLVED 9.In November 1940, the army strength in Malaya was 17 battalions, with 1 mountain regiment of artillery. Reliance for the defence of the Far East was to be placed on air power until the fleet was available but it was the Governments policy to avoid war with Japan. The strength of the air forces in Malaya in November 1940, however, was only 88 first-line aircraft, of which only 48 could be counted as modern. The previous month, the Singapore Conference had recommended a strength of 582 aircraft for the Far East but it was admitted that this was an ideal, and far beyond the bounds of practical possibility.In May 1941, Lieutenant-General A. E. Percival had been appointed General Officer Commanding, Malaya Command, and with it a motley collection of 85 000 British, Australian, Indian and Malayan troops. 10. When in July 1941, the Japanese spread into southern Indo-China, the potential danger to Malaya and Burma increased, as the move gave them a naval base within 750 miles of Singapore and airfields only 300 miles from Kota B haru, the nearest point in Malaya. By the latter part of November, 1941, information accumulated which showed that an early Japanese attack was likely, despite the negotiations in progress in Washington.Both land and air reinforcements had been reaching Malaya, and by 7th December, the eve of the Japanese attack, there were 158 first-line aircraft available, with 88 in reserve; the land forces counted 31 infantry battalions, plus the equivalent of 10 volunteer battalions with some artillery, engineers, and a small armoured car unit, and 5 battalions of Indian States forces, with 7 field regiments 1 mountain regiment, 2 anti-tank regiments, 4 coast defence regiments and five anti-aircraft regiments of artillery and 10 field and 3 fortress companies of engineers – a total strength of close on 85,000 men.Almost one quarter of them were British, about one-sixth Australians, nearly one-half Indian Army, and the remainder local forces. 11. Even then, the R. A. F. Far East Command w as not in a position to fulfill its responsibility of being the primary means of resisting Japanese aggression, while the Army strength was far short of what was required to compensate for the deficiency in aircraft. There were only two-thirds the number of infantry required, no tanks and few armoured cars, and the lack of mobile anti-aircraft guns was serious.The Japanese Order of Battle remains unchanged throughout the course of the Champaign. The Japanese 25th Army consisted of 36,000 men plus air power, naval support and artillery support from the mainland, plus 100 tanks. Even though the Japanese soldiers were not as many compared the British forces they were significantly superior in close air support, armour, co-ordination, tactics and experience, with the Japanese units having fought in China.The Japanese had slightly fewer aircraft, their fighter aircraft were generally superior and achieved air superiority. THE ATTACK 12. Earlier the British had plans in place to forestall Japanese landings in Southern Thailand but Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Command refused permission to launch Operation Matador and Operation Krohcol in advance of the Japanese attack, not wishing to run any risk of provoking the coming war. 13.Incredibly, as late as 29 September 1941, it was still believed by British military and civilian leaders in the Far East that Japan was committed to concentrating forces against the Soviet Union, and it was therefore improbable, so it was argued, that she would at the same time take on Britain, the United States and the Netherlands. By mid-November 1941 the official assessment was that war would not come until March 1942. The Japanese decided otherwise. Now the Japanese has really been on an invasion plan to attack the Malayan Peninsula and take over Singapore with a well planned tactics and operation. 4. On 7 December 1941, a British Hudson reconnaissance aircraft spotted Japanese naval vessels 100 miles/160 Km north-east of Singora with others steaming towards Patani. Despite this clear act of war by Japan, ‘Operation Matador' was not fully launched. Even so, the advance to The Ledge could, and should, have been immediately ordered. This was not done. As a result, an invaluable twenty four hours was lost during which time the Japanese forces landed and the British lost a most valuable opportunity.If they had held The Ledge, the invasion could have been delayed even though the landings could not have been prevented. 15. On the next day it was reported that Japanese troops were attempting to land at Kota Bharu and at the same time Singapore suffered its first air raid. War had come to Malaya. On 8 December the Japanese attacked the British air bases in Malaya with the devastating result that by the end of the day a mere 50 British aircraft were operational, the rest being destroyed. Those still operational were immediately ordered back to Singapore.Thus , on the first day of the attack Japan obtained total air supremacy over Nothern Malaya. The naval Force Z, consisting of the battleships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, together with four destroyers, and commanded by Admiral Tom Phillips had arrived right before the outbreak of hostilities. Later the Japanese came to realised the presence of the battleships and its marching to the Northern Malaya. Two days later, on 10 December, the battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse, the only Royal Navy capital ships in the Far East, were sunk by Japanese torpedo-bombers off Kuantan. 16.The negative effect of the sinking of the Prince of Wales on British morale throughout the world was serious, with a concomitant boost to Japanese morale. By this single stroke Japan gained complete naval command of the South China and Java Seas and a large part of the Indian Ocean by leaving the east coast of Malaya exposed and allowing the Japanese to continue their landings. The drift to war by the Japanese met its objectives by the invasion of the Malayan Peninsula subsequently the Singapore Island. MATADOR PLAN 17. What is Matador Plan? What is the relativity of the drawn up plan is all about to this study?Matador Plan is a plan of action for the defence of Singapore. The two plans were totally different, that in the end they contributed to the downfall of Singapore. Both had their weaknesses. One of the major ones was the lack of co-ordination and command between the Army, Navy and Air Force. The other and more serious is the clash of ideals. The first one a Naval plan by Churchill, the other a Land based plan by Brook-Popham. Now I will outline both plans for a thorough understanding. The Land Based Matador 18. History of Malaya War shows that Brook-Popham was the man on the spot who could evaluate a more accurate assessment of the needs.His plan was a land based Matador. This was a plan of action that envisaged an attack by the Japanese from the North of Ma laya via Thailand and the Kara Isthmus. It was drawn up by Brook-Popham, in August 1941 and he submitted his plan to London for approval. It is believed that if the plan was implemented at the right time, it possibly could have delayed the Japanese long enough to allow the British forces stationed in Malaya and Singapore to mount a delaying action until reinforcements arrived. 19. Land Based Matador relied on assumption that the Japanese would land on the east coast of Thailand at two points that of Songkhla and Pattani.The next would be advancing south to Jitra and lower down to Kroh. It was envisaged in Matador that two forces could intercept them just over the boarder in Thailand, thus allowing long enough for the main force to assemble and attack. There was only one problem, if the British were to implement this without the Japanese being at war with Thailand first, it would be seen as an attack by the British on a neutral country. To complicate matters further Sir Josiah Cosby the British Ambassador in Siam the previous year 1940 had signed a non-aggression pact with Pibul the President of Thailand.Requests by Brook-Popham to London for additional resources to cover this Plan were made around January 1941, but remained unfulfilled. This plan was considered a good plan and consequently it also had its problem due to unavoidable consequences. The main obstacle was one of them being Churchill. It is known that  Churchill had distrust of it lay in the political aspects and at the same time he also favoured being a naval man with a naval solution wherein the plan was mainly a Land Based Matador. The Sea Based Matador 20.The Sea Based Matador referred on the need of resources especially the battle ships to defend the Singapore Island. In Duff Coopers report of the Defence of Singapore in 1939 it was stated that no less than 8 war ships would be needed to defend Fortress Singapore. Churchill was not in the business of land forces at the time, he was First Lord of the Admiralty  as such was fighting for his part in any forthcoming action. Churchill had been told of the situation of what he later proclaimed in Parliament as, â€Å"Fortress Singapore† and its armaments.He proclaimed that â€Å"It had several big guns and there were a lot of troops on a island that he had never seen, but not enough in the way of Navy†. 21. At Duff Coopers conference of the 29th September 1941 in Singapore, it was stated that at the least Two Battleships would be needed as a minimum. Those attended the meeting were Sir Robert Brook-Popham, Sir Earl Page, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, Sir Shenton Thomas, Governor of Singapore and Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton. Once Churchill became the Prime Minister he held the final decision. But what Churchill sent and eventually happened, was a cobbled result. The Prince of Wales' and ‘Repulse' that turned up with escorts called â€Å"Force Z†. It was a disaster for the British upon the sinking of the two main battle ships. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 22. The chronology of events that involved along the path of Matador Plan implementation are as follows. a. In year 1937. Major-General William Dobbie Officer Commanding Malaya (1935 – 1939), looked at Malaya's defences, he reported that during the monsoon season from October to March landings could be made by an enemy on the east coast and bases could be established in Siam.He predicted that landings could be made at Songkhla and Pattani in Siam, Thailand and Kota Bharu in Malaya. He recommended large reinforcements to be sent immediately. His predictions turned out to be correct but his recommendations were ignored. b. In January 1941. A request for additional resources remained unfulfilled which the plan intended to use and the previous year in 1940 Sir Josiah Cosby the British Ambassador in Siam, had signed a non-aggression pact with Prime Minister Pibul of Siam. c. In August 1941.The Commander-in-Chief (Cin C) of British Far East Command Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham submitted a plan code named Matador to London for approval. The plan relied on assumption that the Japanese would land on the east coast of Siam at Songkhla and Pattani, then advancing south to Jitra and lower down to Kroh. It was envisaged that two forces could intercept them just over the border in Thailand, long enough for the main force to assemble and attack. d. On November 29, 1941. Air Headquarters at Singapore is warned to be ready to support Operation Matador at 12 hours notice. e. On November 30, 1941.The Commanding Officer of the Japanese 25th Division, Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita, receives orders to proceed with the invasion of Singapore. At the same time 21 Squadron RAAF is based at Sungei Patani. f. On December 2, 1941. HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse arrive at Singapore Harbour escorted by a number of ships including HMAS Vampire. g. On December 4, 1941. The Japanese fleet leaves Samah Harbour at d awn. h. On December 5, 1941. When the threat of Japanese invasion became more likely, the plan was modified to use the forces available, it was to be put into action as soon as an attack was imminent.The plan was that if an enemy attacked, or were invited into, Siam, troops under British command would rush to Songkhla and defend it against a sea borne attack. This job was allocated to Major-General Murray-Lyon's Indian 11th Infantry Division who also had to defend Jitra, this over stretched his resources and made it a difficult task to do. i. On December 5, 1941. London gave permission for Cin C Far East Command to decide if Operation Matador should be activated. The chief strategic decision to be decided was whether Siam should be invaded in a pre-emptive move before the Japanese landings took place.Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was ordered to launch Operation Matador. The Malaya Command was responsible for the detailed planning of Operation Matador. j. On December 6, 1941. It had rewor ked the plan and allocated forces for immediate deployment. Which is what General Officer Commanding Malaya Arthur Percival recommended that evening in meeting with the Governor Sir Shenton Thomas and Cin C Brooke-Popham decided it is premature to launch the operation which included the pre-emptive move into Siam. With hind sight this was the wrong decision. 23.However, if Matador had been implemented the Japanese had a counter worked out. They would use the Bangkok airport and the airfields of Southern Siam to enable air cover to be established, and then invade from the Kra Isthmus. TACTICAL ASPECTS APPLIED 24. There were a lot of differences between British prediction and actual location of the Japanese landings in Malaya Peninsula. For detail, refer to figure 1 and figure 2 in appendix. The ‘Red' dot on the map is where the last sighting of the approaching Japanese armada was on the 6th December at approx 12. 30am by British RAF spotter planes.And the ‘Orange' dot on the map the â€Å"presumed British† and â€Å"actual Japanese† meeting place of the Japanese fleet on the 7th December 1941. The real Japanese meeting place was just 200 miles from Songkhla, Pattani and Kota Bharu, the assumed meeting place by Brook-Popham was some 400 miles, double the distance and of course double the time. In the event the Japanese landed at, Prachoup 1 craft, Chumphon 2 craft, Bandon 2 craft, Nakhon 3 craft, Songkla and Pattani 18 craft and  Kota Bharu 3 craft. 25. The Japanese had forestalled the effect of Matador by having a secondary plan.In the event if Matador was implemented, the Japanese were under the orders to occupy the airfield of Bangkok and the airfields of Southern Thailand to enable air cover to be established, thus paving the way for the invasion from the Kara Isthmus and the inevitable fall of Singapore. It shows the invader is truly tactical enough to apply the secondary plan if the primary met with failure. It was the combinati on of confused action and wildly differing approaches to what was perceived as the enemies’ tactics that eventually lead to the fiasco of Malaya and Fortress Singapore.Beside, the Japanese also use ‘blitzkrieg’ tactics that was used by the Germans during Europe Campaign. BATTLE ANALYSIS ANALYSIS ON FACTORS AND EFFECTS 26. The Matador plan can be analyzed from several factors which concluded to its failure. The factors identified are as follows: a. Lack of Resources. The Matador plan relied on assumption that the Japanese would land on the east coast of Siam at Songkhla and Pattani, then advancing south to Jitra and lower down to Kroh.British forces could intercept them just over the border in Thailand, long enough for the main force to assemble and attack. But the plan was modified to use the forces available and it was to be put into action as soon as an attack was imminent. If an enemy attacked, or were invited into Siam, troops under British command would rush to Songkhla and defend it against a sea borne attack. This job was allocated to Major-General Murray-Lyon's of Indian 11th Infantry Division who also had to defend Jitra, this has over stretched his resources and made it a difficult task to do.Beside, in the absence of the main fleets, RAF was fully responsible to carry out its task effectively in defence, it was estimated that it required a minimum of 336 modern aircraft including a long range striking force. At the outbreak of hostilities it had a mere 158, most of which were obsolescent. The lack of resources and the assign of multiple tasks at one time by the British made them facing more difficulties in defending its position against the Japanese. b. Non-strategic defence position.The decision to defend the Singapore base by holding the whole of Malaya meant that in the absence of the fleet the task fell primarily on the RAF. Because of the key role allotted to the air force it was decided that the primary task of the army was to defend the airfields from which the RAF operated. These airfields had been built without reference to the military but rather to suit civilian requirements. From a military viewpoint they were located too close to the coast and too close to the border of Siam to be effectively defended. c. Time Window.Matador was approved late for the plan to succeed. For Operation Matador to succeed, time was of the absolute essence. British forces had to be in Singora before the Japanese landed. However, as Britain attempted to the very end to avoid war with Japan, the military were forbidden to violate Siamese territory until an actual outbreak of war. With such a constraint, and time being of the essence, Operation Matador should have been abandoned. d. Command and Control. Earlier on December 5, 1941, London gave permission for Cin C the Far East Command to decide if Operation Matador should be activated.The strategic decision to be decided was whether Siam should be invaded in a pre-emptiv e move before the Japanese landings took place. The Malaya Command was responsible for the detailed planning of Operation Matador and on December 6, 1941 it had reworked the plan and allocated forces for immediate deployment. General Officer Commanding Malaya Arthur Percival recommended in meeting with the Governor of Singapore Sir Shenton Thomas and Cin C Brooke-Popham decided it is premature to launch the operation which included the pre-emptive move into Siam. e. Political Aspects.British do not want to be the first nation to trespass the non alliance of Thailand in the war and will not approved matador planned until there is solid evidence that shows that the Japanese is up to move to Thailand territory. To forestall the anticipated Japanese invasion the British High Command evolved a plan to seize the Siamese port of Singora which is ‘Operation Matador' and to delay the anticipated Japanese advance from Patani by holding a position called ‘The Ledge'. This plan requ ired crossing the international frontier into Siam thus making Britain guilty of violating official Siamese neutrality.In the year 1940 Sir Josiah Cosby the British Ambassador in Siam, had signed a non-aggression pact with Prime Minister Pibul of Siam. f. Lack of Importance. Under the command of Jen AE Percival, there were some 85000 British, Australian, Indian and Malayan troops. However some of the problems associated with this force included poor quality officers, poor training, especially in jungle warfare, lack of civilian labour to construct defences and lack of homogeny. g. The Blame. The blame of Matador Plan failure cannot only be pointed to General Percival because the launch of the plan must be approved from Churchill in London.He must have disliked it so much and there weren’t any reference to it in Churchill's memoirs as well. He seems to have conveniently forgotten all about it. Churchill’s distrust of it lay in the political aspects, he also favoured bei ng First Lord of the Admiralty   a naval man, a naval solution thus the sea based matador were developed. h. Operation Theatre Priorities. The Matador Plan was stalled repeatedly by Churchill, who wanted the scarce resources of aeroplanes, troops and other equipment diverted to his other priority areas, such as the Middle East and Russia.Britain's defence, the Middle East and the Soviet Union had all received higher priorities in the allocation of men and material, so the desired air force strength of 300 to 500 aircraft was never reached whereas the Japanese invaded with over two hundred tanks, the British Army in Malaya did not have a single one. i. The Wrong Assessment. Other than that, the war in the Middle East, the world's oil pipeline and gateway to India, was not going well. At the same time, Russian vulnerability added to the complexities of the situation.In 1941, Churchill delivered 440 aircraft to Russia. He also diverted an entire division, which was bound for Singapor e, the 7th Australian Division, to the Middle East and one brigade of the 9th Indian Division to Iraq. Churchill estimate, Japan will not enter the war unless the Germans had invaded Britain successfully. j. Lack of Intelligence. British intelligence had failed in providing the real assessment of Japanese assault lan on Malaya. As a result the British had failed to provide an adequate force and resources to meet the Japanese thrust.LESSON LEARNT 27. In the final analysis, it was a British failure to adhere to the principles of war in the implementation of the Matador Plan and the Japanese vision and motivation that led to the defeat of the British in the Malayan Campaign. a. Selection and The Maintenance Of The Aim. British has made the wrong decision making on the aspects of strategic defence plan of Malaya rather than knowing and understanding the Japanese strategic plan to conquer Malaya and Singapore. Japanese intentions are as follows: )Japan maybe to conquer Singora and Patani as habour to seize the important air field at Kedah and then move to North West of Malaya. 2)Landed at Kota Bharu to take over the air field. 3)Landed at Kuantan and move to west over the Kuantan-Raub road or Mersing road for Singapore assault through North of Malaya. Percival was unaware of these intentions and put the little sources to defence the other different area. On the other hand, the British thought that Japan will assault Malaya through Singapore. b. Maintenance Of Morale. The Japan inner strength was very high.All the Japan soldiers had their ideology which is â€Å"east for east† where in their psychology they had to rise with the morale in order to face war difficulties. Japan had all the factors that guaranteed the success with having good war equipment, efficiency and encouragement. c. Concentration of Force. The British didn’t forestalled a large number of forces at the planned or strategic location in order to resist any Japanese landing from the Nor th wherein this was an advantages to the Japanese forces. d. Economy of Effort. The highest Japan Royal Company gave 100 days to conquer Malaya and Singapore.Thinking about the mission, Jen Yamashita gave their order to throw the unnecessary equipment from their soldier and planning to remain a smooth movement from combination of expensive British roads and cheap Japan bicycle. He ordered his soldier that didn’t have any vehicle to ride bicycle. This is not just gave the smooth movement but also reduce man power from jungle tracking and walk. e. Surprise. Japan has attack Malayan from North where the British defence was very weak at the enemy aimed position. They attack Malaya in raining season when British not expected the Japan will attack on that time.That situation was entirely a surprise and a piece of well planned action. f. Offensive Action. Japan launched amphibious assault in north beach Malaya at Kota Bahru to move down into East beach of Malaya. This movement is do ne by landed at Patani and Singora in Thailand, whereas they move to South through road land to cross Malayan-Thailand borders to attack from west of Malaya. g. Cooperation. Cooperation can be analysed by comparing the both forces and there are: 1)Original defence planning on Malaya and Singapore depend on two factors, and it was British Far East Armada and American Pacific Armada.Far East Armada was supposed to have 1 carrier, 7 battleship, 11 cruiser and 24 destroyer was not to send because the strategic situation at Europe and Mediterranean and the effect from France failure. The British had no option rather than to deliver 2 battleships that are Repulse and Prince of Wales, while America Pacific Armada was destroyed at Pearl Habour. It was a fail of cooperation that British had no choices to support while Japan easily landed at Malaya. 2)While the Japanese had successfully integrated their entire asset including land, sea and air in giving the maximum fire power and maneuver.The cooperation between 3rd div (Air) Commander, Southern Sqn (Sea) Commander with all (Land) Army Chief’s a success to destroyed the British defence position. 25th Army Commander Lt Jen Yamashita had given his authority to coordinate the sea and air asset in order to achieve ‘mui’ in conquering Malaya and Singapore. h. Security. Beach defence built at Malaya in order to face the Japanese landings, including concertina wire, under water obstacles and machine gun placement were not good enough to give a supreme security and protection for the British.The implication from this, the British suffered a lot of casualties. Japanese also suffered a lot of casualties and this has shown that the British weakness in order to make sure the safety of their soldier itself. i. Flexilibity. To launch the Matador Plan Percival needed permission from British government in London. British government refused to launch this plan until they have proofs that the Japanese has landed in Th ailand. That situation shows that matador plan does not have the flexibility for an execution purposes. CONCLUSION 28.The Matador plan can be analyzed from several factors which conclude to its failure. The factor involves all aspects from the column of battle analysis. Matador was approved late for the plan to succeed. For Operation Matador to succeed, time was of the absolute essence. The delays in mobilization meant that the troops did not receive the order to launch ‘Operation Matador' effect, and morale suffered. An attempt by British troops to advance to The Ledge fell six miles 9. 6 km short of its objective when on 10 December 1941 Japanese troops overran the leading battalions.Another disaster, and with it any real chance for British troops to delay the Japanese advance until relief came, occurred on 12 December 1941 when the strategically-located and well-prepared Jitra position was abandoned within twenty four hours of being attacked. 29. The intention of the Britis h had been to hold it for approximately three months. Thus, after the twenty years of preparation to avoid such an eventuality, the fate of Malaya, and with it Singapore, was sealed in the first four days of the campaign.In the words of Major General Woodburn Kirby, ‘One can sum up by saying that those responsible for the conduct of the land campaign in Malaya committed every conceivable blunder. They underrated the enemy, paid insufficient attention to the training of their troops and delayed taking urgent decisions even after the Japanese had landed on Malayan soil. Singapore and the naval base were lost between 8 and 12 December'. Prime Minister of Britain, Churchill and all his decision made during the Malayan Campaign was also considered as a worst decision making in the war campaign ever in the history.Appendix 1 [pic] Figure 1: This shows what Brook-Popham had assumed happened from the intelligence he had received. [pic] Figure 2: This is what actually happened from the records of the Japanese BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Cull Brian, Buffaloes Over Singapore, Grub Street, London 2003. 2. Lt Gen AE Percival, The War in Malaya. 3. Sir John Smyth V. C, Percival and The Tragedy of Singapore, 1987. 4. Wikipedia, Battle of Malaya, HTML. 5. Chye Kooi Loong, The British Battalion In The Malayan Campaign 1941-1942, 2002. [pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic][pic]

What You Dont Know About Easy Proposal Essay Topics Could Be Costing to More Than You Think

What You Don't Know About Easy Proposal Essay Topics Could Be Costing to More Than You Think Characteristics of Easy Proposal Essay Topics Now you have a brilliant concept, you're half way to your stunning success. If it's the very first time you're likely to use our article writing service, you most likely have plenty of questions. Make a list of everything that you believe is interesting and confirm your list with your teacher to be certain that you're staying on topic. A whole lot of students are trying to find help from educational sites lately, so much it has come to be a standard occurrence. School should happen in the evenings. Year round school isn't a good idea. Students ought to be permitted to pray in school. The Ways students ought to be educated about their wellbeing. Easy Proposal Essay Topics Can Be Fun for Everyone Take the time to compose the points in a different place from the one which you are likely to compose the essay. You should keep your grades up so you may continue to reach your objective. Over the past ten years, it's been helping thousands of students fulfill their academic targets. Every student necessitates help with homework from time to time. The first thing you've got to do when you're going to begin working on your paper is to write up a proposal. There's no established definition of an excellent subject, and the right type of topic will be different based on the subject you're studying, but there a few things which will often constitute a great essay topic. The very best method which can help you arrive at a subject is via thinking of the activities which you are involved in any of your groups. The very first step you will have to do is identify the problem you wish to propose a solution for. Whether It's your very first or fiftieth time to compose a proposal essay, these strategies can help you to achieve your mission. Before writing your proposal you should do the next things. To make sure that you will see a complete answer to every question, we've got a support team that's always online. Moreover, the subject selected also needs to demonstrate a deeper comprehension of current issue all around Earth, and an urge to repair it. Easy Proposal Essay Topics Fundamentals Explained Proposal essays are sort of assignments that are provided to the students until they start writing the actual essay on the subject. Students may easily write argumentative essay or other kinds of essays like persuasive essays proposal assignments with the support of topics that are listed in the subsequent list. A Proposal essay is quite straightforward to comprehend. Writing a proposal essay isn't as difficult as it might sound, it is irrelevant the way your professor or teacher describes it. When you have written the essay, you need to always write off your source of information. The heading of the research essay ought to be in the center position. When you search for an excellent research paper topic, it's possible to easily grow to be the severest critic of any proposed idea. There are several different proposal essay topics that can be researched to help give you inspiration, though whatever you decide to do, check it is an acceptable topic with your professor, and be certain you've got an interest in the subject. Easy Proposal Essay Topics Options To choose the best topics, you must choose something that's of interest to you. Not to worry, you will locate some incredible ideas below. The research can help you to get credible supporting statements. The ways students ought to be taught about their wellbeing. Spam mail ought to be outlawed. You will have the ability to get notifications on different milestones made in your essay like the completion of your pap er. Now just await the completed assignment to land in your own personal mail inbox and you may download it with no hassle. The most frequently encountered paper writing service that the majority of our clients require is essay writing. Nowadays it is quite difficult to locate a trustworthy essay writing service. In any case, our experienced group of writers possesses in-depth understanding of the way to compose a proposal essay. Contemporary education is overloaded with written assignments, so should you require high-quality help with it, you might consider ordering a paper from an internet assignment writer. Easy Proposal Essay Topics - Is it a Scam? Also, you'll find college essay ideas on our website! Writing very good research papers doesn't need to be hard. Basically, fantastic essay topic is half of succeeding. Curriculum proposal topics is a means to try.

5 Words of Advice and 10 Wedding Toasts for the Groom

At most weddings, it is the bride who takes the center stage. The groom often remains in the background. Most people forget that the wedding day belongs to the groom too. If you are one of the people who do remember this and want to raise a toast to the groom, these 5 tips should be of great help. The groom is as much a part of the wedding as the bride. He may also encounters the usual wedding jitters, last minute panic attacks, and even a small desire to make a dash out of the country. But men are expected to be stoic and gallant, as they wait for their beautiful bride to walk down the aisle, as he waits for her at the altar. In case you are the lucky groom who is ready to get married to the love of your life, here are some last minute wedding day advice for grooms: 1. Make Sure to Get Adequate Rest. Even If You Have Had a Wild Night of Bachelor Party. A cranky bride is bad enough. But a cranky groom is worse. Nobody wants to see you frown, or look grumpy on your big day. So get some rest. If your friends are throwing a bachelor party for you, make sure to not stay up too late, and get stone drunk. The last thing you want to do is draw disapproving glances from the in-laws. 2. Learn Your Wedding Vows Well. If you are reciting your own wedding vows, make sure that you have a copy handy, in case you fumble and flub your lines. Remember, the wedding is being caught on tape. And years from today, you will have to hear about your pathetic wedding vows, and how you sounded like a lunatic. 3. Have Your Best Man and Friends Help You Out. Leave the nitty gritty to your friends and folks. They should have to do some work for all the free booze and food, right? Make sure that the florist, the musicians and the cake artists are taken care of by your friends and relatives. Its your day, after all. 4. Dont Sweat the Small Stuff. Focus on the Moment. Your wedding tie is not in place? Who cares? Do you feel that you look a bit dull? Believe me, nobody will notice. All eyes are on the bride today. You just have to look happy. So do your part, and enjoy the day. 5. Dont Invite Your Exes to the Party. This does not need to be said, but the sooner you bury your past, the better for you. Your future wife is not going to look kindly on your generous act of inviting your exes. It is time to build a new life with a new wife. So let bygones be bygones. Here are some funny, interesting, and inspirational wedding toasts for the groom. Enjoy every moment of your wedding, and make the memory last forever. Marguerite De ValoisLove works in miracles every day: such as weakening the strong, and stretching the weak; making fools of the wise, and wise men of fools; favoring the passions, destroying reason, and in a word, turning everything topsy-turvy.AerosmithFalling in love is so hard on the knees.Albert EllisThe art of love is largely the art of persistence.Margaret MeadHaving someone wonder where you are when you dont come home at night is a very old human need.Oscar WildeWoman begins by resisting a mans advances and ends by blocking his retreat.King VidorMarriage is not a word; it is a sentence.Ann LandersIf you have love in your life it can make up for a great many things you lack. If you dont have it, no matter what else there is, its not enough.Kim AndersonYou love simply because you cannot help it.